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Abstract
Background: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV)
use, beginning with serotype 2-containing OPV (i.e., OPV2 cessation) followed by the remaining two OPV serotypes
(i.e., OPV13 cessation). The risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks after OPV cessation of any
serotype depends on the serotype-specific population immunity to transmission prior to its cessation.
Methods: Based on an existing integrated global model of poliovirus risk management policies, we estimate the
serotype-specific OPV doses required to manage population immunity for a strategy of intensive supplemental
immunization activities (SIAs) shortly before OPV cessation of each serotype. The strategy seeks to prevent any
cVDPV outbreaks after OPV cessation, although actual events remain stochastic.
Results: Managing the risks of OPV cessation of any serotype depends on achieving sufficient population immunity
to transmission to transmission at OPV cessation. This will require that countries with sub-optimal routine
immunization coverage and/or conditions that favor poliovirus transmission conduct SIAs with homotypic OPV
shortly before its planned coordinated cessation. The model suggests the need to increase trivalent OPV use
in SIAs by approximately 40 % or more during the year before OPV2 cessation and to continue bOPV SIAs
between the time of OPV2 cessation and OPV13 cessation.
Conclusions: Managing the risks of cVDPVs in the polio endgame will require serotype-specific OPV SIAs in
some areas prior to OPV cessation and lead to demands for additional doses of the vaccine in the short term
that will affect managers and manufacturers.
Background
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) primarily
relied on oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to make great
progress toward interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV)
transmission, including apparent interruption of indigenous
serotype 2 WPV (WPV2) by the year 2000 and serotype 3
WPV (WPV3) by the year 2012 [1–3]. OPV contains atten-
uated live poliovirus that can infect both recipients and
contacts, mimicking infection with WPV to provide good
intestinal immunity with a very low risk of vaccine-
associated paralytic polio [4, 5]. However, in places with
very low population immunity to transmission, OPV can
evolve to acquire WPV-like properties and cause outbreaks
of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) [6–8].
The risks associated with OPV motivate plans for globally-
coordinated cessation of all serotype 2 - containing OPV
(i.e., OPV2 cessation) in 2016 and the remaining two OPV
serotypes after 2018 (i.e., OPV13 cessation) [2]. Dynamic
poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution models based
on the current state of the evidence [7, 9–12] strongly
suggest the need to achieve high homotypic population
immunity to transmission at the time of OPV cessation of
any serotype to prevent OPV-related viruses from evolving
into cVDPVs shortly after OPV cessation [13].
Clinical trials suggest that the inactivated poliovirus
vaccine (IPV) provides excellent humoral immunity to
protect from paralytic poliomyelitis disease and also
effectively boosts intestinal immunity in individuals with
prior immunity induced by a live poliovirus infection
(i.e., WPV, OPV, OPV-related, or VDPV) [10, 14–16].
However, immunity induced by IPV-alone does not
* Correspondence: rdt@kidrisk.org
Kid Risk, Inc., 10524 Moss Park Rd., Ste. 204-364, Orlando, FL 32832, USA
© 2015 Duintjer Tebbens and Thompson. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link
to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication
waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise
stated.
Duintjer Tebbens and Thompson BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:390 
DOI 10.1186/s12879-015-1114-6
protect as well as OPV from asymptomatic participation
in fecal-oral poliovirus transmission and does not provide
any secondary immunity to contacts [10, 17, 18]. In popu-
lations with conditions conducive to fecal-oral poliovirus
transmission, IPV use thus provides little reduction in
potential participation in poliovirus transmission among
previously unvaccinated individuals that contribute most
to transmission [19–21]. Given that cVDPVs remain most
likely to emerge in places with low routine immunization
(RI) coverage and intense fecal-oral transmission, models
that factor in the higher immunogenicity and intestinal
boost provided by IPV [12] suggest that IPV use does not
appear to substantially reduce the risk or consequences of
cVDPV emergences from parent OPV strains or already
circulating partially- or fully-reverted OPV-related viruses
following OPV cessation [21–23]. Consequently, maximiz-
ing population immunity just prior to OPV cessation of
any given serotype(s) requires high homotypic OPV use
up until OPV cessation [13, 21].
While RI with OPV continues to rely on trivalent OPV
(tOPV), which contains all 3 serotypes and currently
represents the only licensed OPV vaccine containing
serotype 2, the GPEI focus on eradicating the remaining
two WPV serotypes led it to shift many supplemental
immunization activities (SIAs) since 2005 from tOPV to
monovalent OPV serotype 1 (mOPV1), monovalent OPV
serotype 3 (mOPV3), and bivalent OPV (bOPV, serotypes 1
and 3) [24]. However, to manage the risks of serotype 2
cVDPVs (cVDPV2s) after OPV2 cessation (i.e., prevent
their creation), the GPEI needs to ensure sufficient use of
tOPV prior to OPV2 cessation. After OPV2 cessation,
the vaccination strategy should maintain high vaccin-
ation intensity, but with bOPV instead of tOPV, until
OPV13 cessation. Given the lead times associated with
vaccine orders, timely planning of OPV needs prior to
OPV cessation represents a key part of risk manage-
ment. We seek to characterize the expected needs for
the different OPV formulations leading up to OPV
cessation using an integrated global model of long-
term poliovirus risk management policies for a strat-
egy that supports an expectation of no cVDPVs follow-
ing OPV cessation [25]. We focus on characterizing
expected vaccine needs for the current global plans and
timelines for OPV cessation for the GPEI Strategic Plan
2013-2018 [2]. We separately consider the implications of
tOPV vs. bOPV choices for meeting WPV eradication goals
and managing cVDPVs [26].
Methods
We used an existing integrated global model of long
term poliovirus risk management policies (i.e., the global
model) [25] that relies on a differential equation - based
dynamic poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution
model [9, 12] to simulate poliovirus spread and
immunity within populations and cVDPV emergence in
the event of insufficient population immunity to trans-
mission. Specifically, given that susceptible individuals
remain infectious with a poliovirus for approximately
30 days [12] and that the model assumes that any
OPV-related virus introduced prior to OPV cessation can
continue to transmit as long as its prevalence remains
above a certain threshold, it takes some time before OPV-
related viruses die-out after OPV cessation. If during that
time population immunity to transmission drops to low
enough levels, then the OPV-related viruses will continue
to transmit and ultimately result in a cVDPV outbreak
[13]. The model simulates OPV cessation as planned by
the GPEI [2] with OPV2 cessation on April 1, 2016 as cur-
rently targeted, [27] followed by OPV13 cessation on April
1, 2019, which remains within the current window for this
event [2]. The global model does not characterize actual
individual countries, which vary widely in size and
immunization and exposure histories, but instead uses
generalized approximations of national-level demo-
graphic [28] and vaccine coverage data [29] for 710
subpopulations of roughly equal size averaging ap-
proximately 10 million people (as of 2013), grouped
into 71 blocks of 10 subpopulations that mix preferen-
tially with each other. We include 4 blocks with condi-
tions like the last WPV-endemic areas in the world,
including the presence of an under-vaccinated sub-
population with very low immunization rates in each
[9, 19, 30] We stratify the 71 blocks by World Bank
income level (i.e., low, lower middle, upper middle,
and high) [31] and polio vaccine use (i.e., OPV-only,
sequential IPV/OPV use, IPV-only) [32] according to
the distribution of the population as of 2013 [28].
To approximate levels of population immunity to
transmission at the beginning of the analytical time hori-
zon in 2013 with a reasonable simulation run time, the
global model specifies an accelerated and generalized run-
up of 43 years using a simplified history of polio vaccin-
ation in each subpopulation [25]. The true vaccination his-
tory in different countries remains highly complex and
difficult to reconstruct, particularly as it relates to SIAs
[33]. Current SIA schedules for polio depend on many fac-
tors, including the epidemiological situation, financial con-
straints, shifting priorities, and national preferences.
They remain highly irregular and sometimes involve
different activities on a small scale, in some cases imply-
ing heterogeneity at a finer level than the 10 million
people we use to characterize subpopulations in the
model. The global model abstracts from this complexity
by specifying SIA schedules for each subpopulation that
depend on the assumed coverage with 3 or more non-
birth RI doses (POL3), basic reproduction number (R0),
and epidemiologic state (i.e., before eradication of all
WPVs, after eradication of all WPVs, or during an ongoing
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outbreak of cVDPV or imported WPV). Although the glo-
bal model does not use actual historic and planned
immunization activities, from 2010 forward (i.e., the time
of bOPV adoption for some SIAs), the global model aims
to closely represent the true global intensity of vaccination
used by countries and the GPEI.
The global model assumes sufficient frequency of
tOPV SIAs to prevent cVDPV2 emergence after OPV2
cessation. This involves tOPV intensification relative
to the prior frequency of tOPV SIAs starting on January 1,
2015 until OPV2 cessation on April 1, 2016. However, in
some settings the need to intensify tOPV use prior to
OPV2 cessation remains a topic of discussion. For this
analysis, we consider scenarios without such tOPV in-
tensification to show the potential impact on cVDPV2
risks and resulting serotype 2 monovalent OPV (mOPV2)
needs for outbreak response. Given our focus on charac-
terizing the difference in cVDPV2 risks with or without
tOPV intensification in the short-term, we consider a
short time horizon and ignore all long-terms risks of
poliovirus reintroductions (i.e., immunodeficiency-
associated vaccine-derived poliovirus introductions and
other releases that stochastically occur over the long-term
considered in detail in the global model [25]).
Table 1 shows the assumed preventive SIA schedules
for subpopulations in blocks that previously interrupted
indigenous WPV transmission. While Table 1 does not
include the schedule for the small number of blocks that
did not yet interrupt indigenous WPV transmission or
blocks experiencing cVDPV or WPV importation out-
breaks [25], it captures the SIA assumptions for the ma-
jority of blocks. We compared our estimates of required
OPV doses associated with intensification efforts to the
GPEI SIA plans as of February 1, 2015. As shown in
Table 1, we determine the annual number of SIAs based
on modeled RI coverage and R0 (i.e., we differentiate be-
tween settings with very high R0 > 10 and lower R0).
During tOPV intensification, we use tOPV for all SIAs
in subpopulations with 1 annual SIA, for the first 2
annual SIAs for subpopulations with at least 3 annual
SIAs, and for at least the first 3 annual SIAs for subpop-
ulations with 5 or more annual SIAs. We allow the
model to maximize population immunity at the time of
OPV2 cessation by optimally using tOPV in the run-up
to OPV2 cessation. Thus, the model uses tOPV in all
SIAs conducted in 2016 that occur before the OPV2 ces-
sation date of April 1, 2016. In addition to tOPV intensi-
fication before OPV2 cessation and consistent with the
Table 1 Assumptions for planned, preventive SIAs (pSIAs) through OPV2 cessation in OPV-using blocks that interrupted indigenous
wild poliovirus transmission (adapted from Thompson and Duintjer Tebbens (2015) [26])
Time period RI coverage (POL3) SIA schedule showing: vaccine (day(s) of year)
Before tOPV intensification
on January 1, 2015
0.05 or 0.1 tOPV (0, 40); bOPV (80, 140, 240, 300)
0.3 tOPV (0, 40); bOPV (80, 140, 240)
0.6 (R0≤ 10) tOPV (0); bOPV (60, 120)
0.6 (R0 > 10) tOPV (0, 40); bOPV (80, 140, 240)
0.9 tOPV (0)
0.98 (R0 ≤ 10) No SIAs
0.98 (R0 > 10) tOPV (0)
During tOPV intensification
(January 1, 2015 to April 1, 2016)
0.05 or 0.1 tOPV (0, 40, 80, 300); bOPV (140, 240)
0.3 tOPV (0, 40, 80); bOPV (140, 240)
0.6 (R0≤ 10) tOPV (0, 60); bOPV (120)
0.6 (R0 > 10) tOPV (0, 40, 80); bOPV (140, 240)
0.9 tOPV (0)
0.98 (R0 ≤ 10) No SIAs
0.98 (R0 > 10) tOPV (0)
After tOPV intensification
(April 1, 2016 to April 1, 2017 or later)
0.05 or 0.1 bOPV (0, 40, 80, 140, 240, 300)
0.3 bOPV (0, 40, 80, 140, 240)
0.6 (R0≤ 10) bOPV (0, 60, 120)
0.6 (R0 > 10) bOPV (0, 40, 80, 140, 240)
0.9 bOPV (0)
0.98 (R0 ≤ 10) No SIAs
0.98 (R0 > 10) bOPV (0)
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current strategy, [2] the model further assumes that all
countries that used OPV-only as of 2013 incorporate
IPV into their RI schedules starting January 1, 2015, ei-
ther as a co-administered dose with the 3rd non-birth RI
OPV dose (in low- and lower middle-income blocks) or
as the first two doses in a sequential IPV/OPV schedule
(in upper middle-income blocks).
Table 2 shows different options of bOPV SIA frequen-
cies we consider starting on January 1, 2017. We include
scenarios that sustain the SIA frequency from before
2017 until OPV13 cessation (i.e., no reduction), reduce
the annual number of SIAs by 1 (in subpopulations with
POL3 = 0.98) or 2 (in subpopulations with POL3 ≤ 0.60)
(i.e., medium reduction), or reduce the annual number of
SIAs by up to 3 in subpopulations with 5 or more annual
SIAs (i.e., large reduction). The current GPEI SIA plans
[2] assume substantially reduced SIA frequency from 2017
forward, similar to the large reduction scenario.
To estimate vaccine needs, we compute the total num-
ber of OPV doses needed (DOPV) in a given year as:
DOPV ¼wri  Dri þ wsia  Dsia
where wri = effective wastage factor associated with RI
wsia = effective wastage factor associated with SIAs
Dri = annual tOPV doses administered in RI
Dsia = annual tOPV doses administered in SIAs
Although national RI schedules vary significantly, [33]
the global model reflects a simplified characterization
based on the most common schedules. To compute Dri, we
assume that all OPV-only-using blocks as of 2013 use
tOPV for RI, assuming negligible impact of any very limited
exceptions (e.g., Israel recently reintroduced bOPV into its
RI program) [19]. We further assume that all OPV-only-
using low- and lower middle-income blocks as of 2013 ad-
minister a birth dose at half of the POL3 coverage (bcov),
with no birth doses administered in upper middle-income
countries or areas using an IPV/OPV sequential schedule.
We account for partial coverage assuming a 20 % chance
that a child who did not receive at least 3 non-birth doses
receives 1 non-birth dose and a 20 % chance that a child
who did not receive at least 3 non-birth doses receives
2 non-birth doses (i.e., cov1 = cov2 = 0.2). Thus, for any
subpopulation that uses OPV-only, the number of ad-
ministered OPV doses in RI equals:
Dri ¼ ni  ½POL3  ndþ ð1POL3Þ  cov1
 2þ ð1POL3Þ  cov1þ POL3  bcov
where ni = annual number of surviving infants
POL3 = coverage with 3 or more non-birth RI doses in
the subpopulation (varies by subpopulation)
nd = number of non-birth RI doses in the schedule
(3 in all subpopulations)
cov1 = coverage with 1 non-birth RI dose given fewer
than 3 non-birth RI doses (cov1 = 0.2 in all subpopulations)
cov2 = coverage with 2 non-birth RI doses given fewer
than 3 non-birth RI doses (cov2 = 0.2 in all subpopulations)
bcov = relative coverage with birth dose compared to
POL3 (bcov = 0.5 in all subpopulations with OPV-
only-using low- or lower middle-income blocks and 0
elsewhere)
We assume that subpopulations using a sequential
IPV/OPV RI schedule administer 2 IPV doses followed
by 2 OPV doses with all partially covered children re-
ceiving only IPV, such that the computation for the
number of OPV doses simplifies to:
Dri ¼ ni  POL3  2
This equation applies only to those countries using
an IPV/OPV schedule as of 2013 and excludes any
GAVI-eligible or other countries that add IPV with
the 3rd OPV dose in 2015, consistent with the GPEIs
current plans [2]. For the year 2016, we estimate the
tOPV RI doses by prorating the total number of RI
doses for the whole year assuming OPV2 cessation on
April 1, 2016 and bOPV use from that point forward.
Consistent with the GPEI cost calculations, [34] we
Table 2 Scenarios for planned, preventive SIAs (pSIAs) with bOPV between OPV2 cessation and OPV13 cessation in OPV-using blocks
Time period RI coverage
(POL3)





Between OPV2 and OPV13 cessation
(January 1, 2017 to April 1, 2019)
0.05 or 0.1 6 (0, 40, 80, 140, 240, 300) 4 (0, 40, 80, 240) 3 (0, 60, 120)
0.3 5 (0, 40, 80, 140, 240) 3 (0, 60, 120) 2 (0, 60)
0.6 (R0 ≤ 10) 3 (0, 60, 120) 1 (0) 1 (0)
0.6 (R0 > 10) 5 (0, 40, 80, 140, 240) 3 (0, 60, 120) 1 (0)
0.9 1 (0) 1 (0) 0
0.98 (R0 ≤ 10) 0 0 0
0.98 (R0 > 10) 1 (0) 0 0
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compute RI vaccine demands based on the expected num-
ber of covered children. The GPEI bases its RI dose needs
estimates on numbers of surviving infants similar to the
UN World Population Prospects (WPP) [28] that we use
in our global model [25]. The GPEI assumptions for RI in-
clude vaccine wastage factors of 1.33 for IPV, but no wast-
age assumption for OPV RI, because the GPEI does not
budget for OPV RI [34]. Despite ambitious goals to lower
wastage in RI, [35] which previously motivated us to use
relatively low OPV wastage values for RI, [36] more recent
estimates indicate wastage factors in low- and lower
middle-income countries as high as approximately 2 (i.e.,
wastage rate of 50 %) [37] and this led us to assume effect-
ive wastage of wri, lmi = wri,low = 2 for low- and lower
middle-income blocks. Consistent with other analyses,
[25, 26] we assume a wastage factor of wri,high =1.11 (i.e.,
wastage rate of 10 %) for high-income blocks based on US
data, [38] while we assume an intermediate wastage factor
of wri,umi = 1.43 (i.e., wastage rate of 30 %) for upper
middle-income blocks.
To compute Dsia, for every SIA, we record the number
of children under 5 years of age in the model at the time
of the SIA, and we then sum over all SIAs that use
different OPV formulations in a given year. In theory,
the SIA vaccine needs depend on the actual coverage of
each SIA. However, in practice the GPEI orders vaccine
based on the total number of children in the target
population rather than the expected number of covered
children. To remain consistent with this practice, we ef-
fectively assume 100 % expected coverage for each SIA
when we calculate Dsia, although the global model uses
best estimates of true coverage, which remain below
100 % for each SIA. For planned SIAs between 2012-2019,
the GPEI wastage factors ranged from 1.07 (Benin, 2014)
to 1.67 (Syrian Arab Republic, 2013), with the majority
between 1.1 and 1.3 and an overall population-weighted
average wastage factor of approximately 1.2. Our global
model uses the WPP estimates of the number of chil-
dren under 5 years of age [28]. However, in the context
of comparisons, we observed that the GPEI assumes
significantly different child population numbers in
many countries when planning SIA vaccine needs. For
example, in 2013 the GPEI planned national
immunization days (NIDs) targeting 0-4 years olds for
45 countries. The GPEI assumed a total population of
0-4 year olds approximately 1.45 times greater than the
population for the same 45 countries estimated by the
WPP (i.e., 479 vs. 334 million children). Large countries
that conduct many SIAs represent major contributors
to this difference (i.e., India accounts for 59 million,
Nigeria for 24 million, Pakistan for 13 million), while
for some smaller countries the GPEI estimates lower
numbers of children under 5 years old than the WPP
(e.g., 2.2 million fewer for Thailand). Given uncertainty
about the true population size and wastage [39] and to
avoid underestimating vaccine needs compared to current
practice, we apply a demographic uncertainty correction
factor of 1.5 when estimating overall vaccine needs for
SIAs, which implies effective wastage for all SIAs of
wsia = 1.2 × 1.5 = 1.8.
Results
Figure 1a shows the expected paralytic cases from sero-
type 2 polioviruses (PV2) for 2016-2019 with (solid blue
curve) and without (red dashed curve) tOPV intensifica-
tion prior to OPV2 cessation. The failure to intensify
tOPV use prior to OPV2 cessation increases both the
risk of missing the target date for OPV2 cessation, [30,
40] and the risk of cVDPV2 outbreaks after OPV2 ces-
sation (Fig. 1a). Intensification of tOPV SIAs prior to
OPV2 cessation prevents cVDPV2 outbreaks after
OPV2 cessation such that the solid line becomes and re-
mains 0 soon after OPV2 cessation. For the dashed curve
without tOPV intensification, a cVDPV2 outbreak origi-
nates from a single subpopulation modeled as the under-
vaccinated communities within one of the blocks repre-
senting the last reservoirs of WPV transmission (i.e., high
R0, low RI coverage, poor SIA quality). Assumed aggres-
sive response that involves block-wide SIAs [25] controls
the outbreak in the subpopulation and prevents spread be-
yond it. The cVDPV2 outbreak in Fig. 1a results in over
50 expected paralytic cases and requires approximately
120 million filled mOPV2 doses from the outbreak re-
sponse vaccine stockpile within the approximately 3.5-
month duration of the outbreak response.
Figure 1b shows the expected paralytic cases from
serotype 1 polioviruses (PV1) following OPV13 cessa-
tion for different options of SIA frequencies between
January 1, 2017 and OPV13 cessation (Table 2). None of
the options resulted in a serotype 3 cVDPV (cVDPV3)
outbreak. The global model runs that assume no reduction
in SIA frequency (solid blue curve) and medium reduction
in SIA frequency (green dotted curve) prevent cVDPV1
outbreaks and thus become and remain 0 soon after
OPV13 cessation. However, the global model run with a
large reduction in SIA frequency (orange dashed curve)
leads to paralytic cases associated with partially- and
ultimately fully-reverted viruses derived from serotype 1-
containing OPV vaccine that can continue to transmit in
the context of insufficient population immunity at the
time of OPV13 cessation. This occurs in the model in the
same subpopulation that experienced a cVDPV2 outbreak
with insufficient tOPV intensification. Figure 1b shows
that the initial outbreak response (i.e., with 4 block-wide
mOPV1 rounds) does not fully interrupt transmission.
After some delay, a second peak in incidence occurs that
triggers more outbreak response rounds (i.e., another 4
block-wide mOPV1 rounds) that stop the transmission.
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The cVDPV1 outbreak results in 5 expected paralytic
cases and requires over 240 million filled mOPV1 doses
from the outbreak response vaccine stockpile (i.e., 121
million doses during the first 4 rounds over a period of ap-
proximately 3.5 months and another 122 million doses be-
ginning approximately 4 months later for the second 4
rounds, which also take approximately 3.5 months).
Figure 2 shows the estimated tOPV and bOPV SIA
needs over time for the various scenarios, compared
to the number of doses reported as required in the
GPEI database. The GPEI SIA plan as of February
2015 recognizes some need to intensify tOPV use in
SIAs before OPV2 cessation, as shown in Fig. 2a by
the increase in expected tOPV needs in 2015 and the
first quarter of 2016, before OPV2 cessation (Fig. 2a).
However, intensification of tOPV use for SIAs in all
modeled populations with low RI coverage (Table 1)
requires a more pronounced increase in tOPV vaccine
needs from approximately 930 million doses in 2014
to almost 1300 million doses in 2015 (i.e., a 40 %
Fig. 1 Impact of SIA intensity on cVDPV outbreaks after OPV2 cessation and OPV13 cessation showing the total paralytic incidence (i.e., including
paralysis from OPV-related viruses in all reversion stages) in a block with a cVDPV outbreak in the event of insufficient homotypic OPV SIA. a Paralytic incidence
due to serotype 2 polioviruses after OPV2 cessation in 2016, with or without tOPV intensification. b Paralytic incidence due to serotype 1 polioviruses
after OPV13 cessation in 2019, for different scenarios of SIA frequency between January 1, 2017
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increase). Since the model takes advantage of using
tOPV for SIAs in early 2016 before the OPV2 cessation
date of April 1, 2016, we emphasize the importance of
ensuring tOPV availability during this time.
Figure 2b shows the estimated bOPV needs. For
2012–2014, the model estimates similar bOPV needs
for SIAs as the GPEI SIA database reports. For 2015,
the bOPV needs remain similar between the current GPEI
plans and the model estimates with tOPV intensification.
However, without tOPV intensification, the global model
uses more bOPV in 2015 than with tOPV intensification
or with the current GPEI plans (Fig. 2b, consistent with
the assumptions in Table 2), and less tOPV (Fig. 2a). The
difference with or without tOPV intensification for 2017
reflects the aggressive mOPV2 use to respond to the
cVDPV2 outbreak that occurs without tOPV intensifica-
tion (Fig. 1a), which in the model overrides otherwise
planned bOPV SIAs. From 2017 forward, the different
bOPV use options result in substantial differences in
bOPV needs. A large reduction in SIA frequency results in
vaccine needs for 2017 and 2018 similar to the GPEI
plans, but does not prevent cVDPV1 outbreaks (Fig. 1b).
No reduction in SIA frequency results in an increase in
bOPV needs because all SIAs that previously used tOPV
switch to bOPV, but prevention of cVDPV1 and cVDPV3
outbreaks after OPV13 cessation does not require such
high SIA intensity. A medium reduction avoids cVDPV1
outbreaks (Fig. 1b) and implies vaccine needs for 2017 and
Fig. 2 Estimated SIA vaccine needs from a global model [25] compared to recent GPEI plans. a tOPV needs. b bOPV needs
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2018 approximately halfway between no reduction in SIA
frequency and the current GPEI plans.
Table 3 shows the model estimates of total expected
tOPV and bOPV vaccine needs from RI and SIAs com-
bined to manage cVDPV risks during the OPV cessa-
tion period. The global RI vaccine needs of
approximately 620 million doses per year in the model
significantly exceed the typical annual UNICEF projections
for RI of approximately 235 million [41]. This occurs be-
cause UNICEF only procures a fraction of all OPV doses,
with large self-producing countries (China, India), the Pan
American Health Organization revolving fund, and vaccine
demand from other countries accounting for the difference.
Consequently, our modeling efforts suggest that the overall
global tOPV needs amount to as much as 3.4 billion doses
between January 1, 2015 and January 1, 2016. Based on the
scenario of no reduction in SIA frequency after OPV2 ces-
sation (not currently planned by the GPEI and not needed
based on our results), bOPV needs remain very high up
until OPV13 cessation, with a total of 8.0 billion doses be-
tween January 1, 2016 and April 1, 2019, and SIAs account-
ing for 71 % of the total. With a medium reduction in SIA
frequency, the total bOPV needs during this time period
decrease to 6.2 billion doses.
Discussion
OPV cessation represents the only way to eliminate the
risks associated with OPV use, [4, 42] but implementa-
tion comes with challenges and risks. Consistent with
prior work, [13, 21, 40] this analysis suggests that high
serotype-specific population immunity to transmission
obtained through continued intense OPV use can prevent
cVDPV outbreaks after OPV cessation of each serotype.
The current GPEI plans provide a reassuring indication that
tOPV use during SIAs will increase in 2015 and 2016
before the targeted OPV2 cessation date. However, our
model suggests somewhat higher overall tOPV vaccine
needs than currently planned to ensure high enough
population immunity to transmission everywhere at the
time of OPV2 cessation. Considering our results that sug-
gest a cVDPV2 outbreak in only one modeled subpopula-
tion without intensification, some may suggest the GPEI
should target SIA intensification only in that
subpopulation without tOPV intensification elsewhere.
However, such a strategy appears highly imprudent in the
context of uncertainty about true coverage, serotype-
specific population immunity, OPV evolution, and ex-
trapolation of the model to the real world [7, 25]. If
cVDPV2 outbreaks occur, they would likely emerge in
areas of historically poor immunization that would face
challenges in achieving the aggressive outbreak response
needed to contain the outbreak, which could jeopardize
OPV2 cessation, in particular if other areas start with rela-
tively lower population immunity to transmission due to
insufficient intensification. Similarly, a strategy of minimal
bOPV SIAs leading up to OPV13 cessation also leads to
significant risk of undesirable cVDPV1 outbreaks after
OPV13 cessation if any of the SIAs do not occur according
to plan. Moreover, data on true RI and SIA coverage remain
of poor quality in many settings, which means that minimal
SIA schedules based on overestimates of true coverage
would not provide high enough population immunity to
transmission at OPV13 cessation to avoid cVDPVs. Due to
longer reversion times and lower transmissibility of OPV1
and OPV3 viruses compared to OPV2, [7, 12] these viruses
will die out sooner after OPV13 cessation than OPV2 vi-
ruses after OPV2 cessation, given the same level of
population immunity to transmission. This suggests
that after global WPV1 eradication and OPV2 cessa-
tion, the frequency of SIAs with bOPV could safely de-
crease to some extent. However, given the potential
health consequences and stockpile vaccine needs in the
event of cVDPV outbreaks of serotypes 1 or 3 after
OPV13 cessation, more bOPV use than strictly needed be-
fore OPV13 cessation appears a necessary and prudent
approach.
A challenge emerges in the context of perceived con-
flicting objectives of simultaneously ensuring WPV1
elimination and safe OPV2 cessation. Due to competition
between the serotypes, tOPV leads to a lower individual
first-dose take rate for serotype 1 than bOPV [12, 24, 33].
However, SIAs with tOPV do not decrease serotype 1
population immunity to transmission, and the difference
between bOPV and tOPV SIAs remains very small, be-
cause with repeated tOPV doses reaching the majority of
the population to induce serotype 2-immunity, subsequent
Table 3 Estimated total tOPV and bOPV vaccine needs based on the global model [25] with different assumptions about the type of
vaccine used for SIAs and different SIA frequencies (not including vaccine needed for outbreak response activities) for options that prevent
cVDPVs after OPV cessationa
Vaccine, time period RI doses (billions) SIAs doses (billions) Total global needs (billions)
tOPV, January 1, 2015 –April 1, 2016 0.8 2.6 3.4
bOPV January 1, 2016 – April 1, 2019
- No reduction in frequency 2.3 5.6 8.0
- Medium reduction in frequency 2.3 3.9 6.2
aThe model assumes feasibility of OPV2 cessation in April 2016, and any delay in that date will add additional doses of tOPV
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doses become de facto bOPV doses with respect to sero-
type 1 and 3 take [26]. For example, a model exploring
tOPV vs. bOPV SIA vaccine choices for northwest Nigeria
found that using tOPV exclusively in all 11 SIAs between
January 1, 2015 and OPV2 cessation would maintain high
enough population immunity to prevent sustained WPV1
transmission and stop and prevent cVDPV2 transmission,
while using bOPV for the rounds fails to stop cVDPV2
transmission [26]. Focusing on WPV1 alone to the detri-
ment of serotype 2 population immunity (i.e., choosing
bOPV over tOPV for SIAs) would effectively imply an ac-
ceptance of paralytic polio cases caused by cVDPV2 and a
need to reconsider the current strategy for serotype-
specific OPV cessation starting with OPV2 cessation [26].
Our results suggest the need for manufacturers to err on
the side of producing more tOPV between now and the
time of OPV2 cessation than they might expect based on
current forecasts from the GPEI, although we recognize
that they will need incentives to do so. Insufficient supplies
of tOPV in the run-up to OPV2 cessation could create real
threats to the OPV2 cessation timeline and cVDPV2 risk
management efforts.
While the current GPEI plans appear to increase tOPV
use before OPV2 cessation, they still create an expect-
ation after OPV2 cessation and WPV eradication that
the need for bOPV SIAs may drop significantly [2]. Our
model suggests that such a decrease would lead to ex-
pected cVDPV1 outbreaks after OPV13 cessation. Thus,
countries that use SIAs to maintain high population im-
munity to transmission and manufacturers that supply
the vaccine for these SIAs should anticipate the need to
continue to use bOPV for relatively frequent SIAs until
OPV13 cessation.
While our model provides information that can sup-
port estimates of the global vaccine needs and considers
the consequences of insufficient vaccine, we note several
limitations. First, the model relies on a hypothetical
characterization of the world that does not fully account
for local heterogeneity (other than by age) within sub-
populations of approximately 10 million people. In the
context of forecasting vaccine needs, the GPEI plan fo-
cuses on a detailed characterization of this heterogeneity
in coverage in some areas, which represents a comple-
mentary approach. Moreover, SIA plans may change
based on the local epidemiological situation and global
strategy and changes in RI. These factors complicate dir-
ect comparisons between the model results and GPEI
plans, and explain some of the differences between mod-
eled and actual historic vaccine needs during 2012-2015.
The GPEI data further do not include all SIAs conducted
outside of the scope of the GPEI (e.g., in China or Latin
America), while our model includes all countries. However,
exclusion of model blocks not included in the GPEI data-
base only resulted in a moderate reduction of the global
vaccine needs for SIAs (i.e., of approximately 10 %). Thus,
the increase in tOPV needs associated with tOPV intensifi-
cation would remain markedly steeper than that reflected
in the GPEI estimates even if the GPEI estimates included
those countries. Consistency between various data sources
further limits the direct application of vaccine needs
estimates from either source to accurately predict true
demand. Furthermore, this analysis focuses on preventive
SIAs prior to OPV cessation and does not comprehen-
sively consider the needs for reactive outbreak response
SIAs, which remains a priority for future research. The
model also does not factor in the current move to use IPV
co-administered with tOPV or bOPV in SIAs in some
countries. While this strategy can overcome the issue of
insufficient immunity provided by IPV in settings with low
RI coverage and can take advantage of IPV’s ability to
boost intestinal immunity of individuals with prior live
poliovirus-induced immunity, it does not eliminate the
issue of inherently limited protection from fecal-oral
transmission provided by IPV-only. The effect of co-ad-
ministering IPV with OPV in SIAs on transmission at the
population level also remains unknown and requires fur-
ther research, particularly in the context of the financial
implications. Finally, all limitations and uncertainties from
the global model carry through to this analysis [12, 25].
Despite its limitations, we hope that this analysis will
stimulate further discussion about the immediate tOPV
needs for successful OPV2 cessation, lead to recognition
of the importance of sufficient OPV vaccine supplies
during the polio endgame, and stress the importance of
creating expectations and plans for bOPV use until
OPV13 cessation. Our analysis also demonstrates a clear
linkage and trade-off between using more OPV prior to
OPV cessation and the amount of expected OPV needed
in the stockpile for outbreak response. Insufficient use of
OPV in preventive SIAs will lead to the need to shift
more of the expected doses in the mOPV stockpiles
available for outbreak response to filled doses instead of
bulk, and could lead to greater ultimate OPV use if the
outbreak response does not prevent the outbreak from
spreading widely. Further research on outbreak response
and vaccine needs for the associated mOPV stockpiles
should consider these trade-offs.
Conclusions
Managing the risks of cVDPVs in the polio endgame will
require serotype-specific OPV SIAs in some areas prior
to OPV cessation and lead to demands for additional
doses of the vaccine in the short term that will affect
managers and manufacturers.
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